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1. Introduction
The rise o f event semantics in many domains o f formal semantics like 
tense, aspect, quantification, adverbial modification, etc. has had an obvious 
impact on the semantic translation o f verbs: verbs are represented as having 
a referential event argument in addition to their thematic arguments. This, 
in turn, forces lexical semantic theories to recur to this event argument in 
their semantic representations o f verbs. Among the various lexical semantic 
approaches, the ones that assume that event structures constitute the nucleus 
of a verb’s meaning probably deviate the most from earlier approaches to 
verb meaning based on theta roles or decompositions. The development of 
such a theory o f Lexical Event Structures as meaning representations for 
verbs is the topic o f this paper. This venture is motivated by the demand for 
an adequate lexical counterpiece to sentential event semantics. It aims at 
developing a theory with a greater breadth o f empirical coverage than is 
achieved by theories mainly concerned with linking. Furthermore, this un­
dertaking is guided by the conviction that lexical semantics needs a more 
solid cognitive foundation to yield empirically contentful semantic repre­
sentations. Thus, the questions to be answered in this paper are: how do we 
conceptualize events and how is this reflected in the grammatical and se­
mantic behavior o f the verbs denoting these events?
The paper will give a concise account o f the theory o f Lexical Event 
Structures. The paper has three objectives which correspond to the following 
three sections. In section 2 I will sketch the theory and discuss the empirical 
goals the theory pursues (section 2.1) and the semantic components Lexical 
Event Structures consist of (section 2.2). Section 3 is devoted to linguistic 
phenomena whose explanation depends on Lexical Event Structures. In 
section 3.1 I will briefly illustrate in how far Lexical Event Structures are re­
lated to phenomena from five central empirical domains o f lexical semantics 
and in section 3.2 it will be shown how Lexical Event Structures function
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in a linking theory. Section 4 aims to show how the central semantic con­
cepts in Lexical Event Structures can be anchored to concepts which are 
well-founded in cognitive science. Section 4.1 discusses the event concept 
employed and illustrates the relation between the perception o f movements 
and the use o f verbs o f movement. Section 4.2 deals with the concept of 
volition with respect to the licensing conditions for intransitive verb pas­
sives. In section 4.3 the distinction between durativity and punctuality, 
which has proven relevant for a number o f verb semantic phenomena, is 
tied to the way we perceive events and structure our own actions. Section 5 
provides a conclusion.1
2. Lexical Event Structures
2.1. Empirical issues
If one proposes a theory on how a verb’s meaning shall be represented, it 
seems worthwhile to spend a few thoughts on how such a theory and the 
particular meaning representations are empirically justified. Most lexical 
semantic theories that have been developed especially to capture verb mean­
ings deal primarily with the question how a verb’s meaning determines the 
syntactic surrounding it occurs in. Starting from this particular research in­
terest, it seems that it is often assumed that the main justification for the 
semantic representation proposed comes from syntactic data. This concep­
tion, I think, is misleading (cf. Engelberg 2000a, 2001).
Let us assume that a linguistic expression LE is assigned the lexical se­
mantic representation SEMas in (la) and is claimed to occur with case pat­
terns (or in syntactic configurations) as represented in the morphosyntactic 
representation SYN in (lb). Let’s further assume that a linking rule like (lc) 
is postulated.
1 This paper reports on one o f the central topics o f the research project “Valency in 
the Lexicon” (part o f the project cluster SFB 282 “Theory o f the Lexicon”), 
headed by Joachim Jacobs, and with Kerstin Blume, Ingrid Kaufmann, Ulrich 
Klein, and Barbara Lenz as collaborators. The project was also concerned with the 
processing o f valency information, the lexical representation o f non-obligatory ar­
guments, marked syntactic valencies, and the valency o f nominalized infinitives.
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(1) a. SEM: PREDA(x, PREDB(y, z))
b. SYN: case1, case2, case3 (or  [NP1 [NP2 NP3] ] )
c. Linking: If the semantic representation o f a lexeme is SEM, then y  
is assigned case2 (or, respectively, y  enters the syntactic structure 
as NP2).
Now, if we want to check whether the statement in ( lc )  is true, we have to 
check whether (la ) is the case, whether (lb ) is the case and whether the 
conditional in (lc ) is borne out by the data. In order to check (la ) we indis­
putably have to know how SEM is to be interpreted. Only if this is suffi­
ciently clear does a statement like ( lc )  have any empirical content. This is 
even more important if  a theory is assumed that claims that statements like 
(lc ) are based on a general homomorphism from lexical semantic onto syn­
tactic structures. Theories of this kind are often particularly susceptible to 
circular argumentations in just imposing syntactic structures onto semantic 
ones.2
To assign a semantic representation SEM to a certain linguistic expres­
sion LE is to claim that LE corresponds to some configuration in the world 
we talk about. In this sense SEM is a description o f the world on a certain 
level o f abstraction. In order to check the correctness o f an assignment o f 
SEM to LE we at least have to check whether LE is indeed about the aspects 
o f the world described in SEM and in order to do that we must of course 
know what SEM is supposed to convey about the world. The interpretation 
o f SEM is based on the assignment o f individual variables to entities and on 
truth conditions for the predicates, relations and operators used in SEM. On 
this basis, the meaning o f complex expressions is computed from that o f its 
parts and the way they are combined. While on the one hand those concepts 
used in SEM which are traditionally employed by sentential semantics -  pro- 
positional relators, quantifiers, temporal operators, etc. -  have been provided 
with fairly precise? truth conditions, predicates like SEAFOOD, FLABBER­
GASTED or CELEBRATE are rather taken at their face value. Fortunately, we
2 It should be noted that while I assume that the structure o f the entities verbs refer 
to greatly matters for lexical semantics I do not exploit any alleged homomorphic 
correspondence between the structural aspects o f lexical meaning and syntactic 
structures. I wouldn’t categorically exclude that such structural correspondences 
exist although I doubt that it is as often the case as has been suggested in verb 
semantics. This paper is simply not about syntax-semantic interfaces o f this sort. 
It neither requires such structural similarities nor is it incompatible with them.
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can often be quite generous with respect to what these predicates mean ex­
actly, as long as it has no impact either on semantic composition or on the 
lexical-semantic licensing of syntactic or semantic phenomena. But this is 
o f course different with respect to those “soft” lexical concepts like ‘agent’, 
‘event’, ‘volition’, ‘causation’ which occur in lexical decompositions or 
meaning postulates and which on the one hand seem to elude the assign­
ment o f precise truth conditions, but on the other hand are used to make 
strong claims about the syntactic and semantic behavior o f lexemes. Any­
how, it cannot be overlooked that lexical semantics has often shied away 
from giving a clear account o f such basic semantic concepts. Thus, they 
remain quite shapeless, such that theories that employ these concepts are 
easily immunized against falsification. In other words, the empirical con­
tent o f a lexical semantic theory is proportional to the degree o f exactness 
with which the truth conditions for their basic predicates are given.
One might o f course object to this demand by claiming that it is so ob­
vious who the agent and who the patient is in Mary hit John that any answer 
to the question what AGENT and PATIENT mean wouldn’t challenge our se­
mantic representations anyways. But, firstly, to pursue its goals a theory is 
obligated not only to use intuitively clear concepts but also to explicate 
them. And secondly, there are numerous cases in which our ignorance of 
the meaning o f semantic termini obviously obstructs progress in the field. 
Psych-verbs and the question in how far agentivity and causation are in­
volved in their meaning (with numerous consequences for predictions 
about their syntactic behavior) constitute one out o f many examples. As 
long as it is not sufficiently clear what CAUSE stands for, one might argue 
that in both fear  and frighten  causation is at stake (with the stimulus being 
the causer; e. g. Dowty 1991: 579) or that only frighten involves causation 
(e. g. Grimshaw 1990: 22) -  whatever suits the theory and allows for the 
desired prediction about the mapping o f arguments into syntax.
What needs to be done to make progress in explicating our basic seman­
tic concepts? I adhere to the not uncontroversial but quite unspectacular 
epistemological view that our experience and knowledge o f the world is me­
diated by our cognitive predispositions. Under this moderate realistic view, 
the entities linguistic expressions are about are entities in this cognitively 
mediated world. If semantic representations are representations o f the world 
we talk about, then we should find ample evidence for the nature o f the en­
tities and predicates employed in our semantic representations in the domain 
o f those cognitive sciences which are devoted to research on the way we 
experience the world. In section 4 I will firstly show that this expectation is
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not unfounded and secondly that there is linguistic evidence that the world 
as cognitively mediated is indeed the world linguistic expressions are 
about.
While a theory that does not provide truth conditions for the semantic 
predicates it employs has no empirical content, a theory that cannot account 
for the syntactic or semantic effects a verb has is linguistically insufficient. 
This conviction explains how the efforts in developing a theory on Lexical 
Event Structures have been distributed. Besides the search for a cognitive 
foundation for the basic semantic concepts, the aim of our research into 
verbs and events was to show that Lexical Event Structures provide the 
right conceptual grounding for the explanation of a wide range o f syntactic 
and semantic phenomena. The empirical coverage of Lexical Event Struc­
tures encompasses phenomena in the following five domains, which I con­
sider to be the central domains o f lexical semantics (historical and acquisi- 
tional phenomena aside):
(i) Semantics-syntax mapping: Semantic properties o f verbs determine to 
a large degree the syntactic realization o f arguments and the ability to 
take part in valency alternations, resultative constructions, etc.
(ii) Selectional restrictions'. The combination of a verb with other lexemes 
is subject to certain semantic restrictions. This concerns the co-occur­
rence o f particular adverbials or derivational morphemes with certain 
classes o f verbs on the one hand and verb-dependent restrictions on 
the NPs filling argument positions on the other.
(iii) Grammatical-categorical restrictions'. Verbs are semantically classi­
fied with respect to their ability to allow the expression o f progressive 
aspect, imperative, particular voices or other contrasts o f grammatical 
categories.
(iv) Interlexematic relations: Verbs stand in semantic relations to each 
other, such as antonymy, hyponymy or synonymy.
(v) Inference behavior. Semantic properties o f verbs influence the infer­
ence behaviour o f lexical items in complex expressions. In particular, 
there are lexically-based inference peculiarities that show up in regular 
alternations of sentence patterns such as in diatheses, or when the tense 
or grammatical aspect o f the sentence is changed. E. g., inferences 
about the internal temporal structure of an event expressed by the 
simple form of a verb might carry over to the progressive form of the 
verb or not, depending on particular lexical verb semantic properties.
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The mereological structure of an event, its temporal properties, and the kind 
of involvement o f participants in the event lie at the core o f the theory that I 
will refer to as ‘Lexical Event Structure Theory’.3 Its basic idea is that the 
meaning o f a verb is to be represented as a Lexical Event Structure (LES) 
which has the following characteristics:
(i) Complexity o f  events: Verbs refer to events that are internally structur­
ed in the sense that they can consist of different subevents (e1, e2, ...)  
and possibly a state (5).
(ii) Sorts o f  subevents: The subevents are durative (eDUR) or punctual 
(gPCT)
(iii) Relations between subevents: Subevents stand in temporal relations to 
each other, e. g., a subevent e1 can precede a subevent e2 completely 
(e1 < e2), or e1 can overlap with e2 (e1 o e2) (cf. for details Engelberg 
2000a, 2004).
(iv) Participation in subevents'. The event participants which correspond to 
the arguments of the verb are not necessarily involved in all subevents, 
but rather only in some o f them; semantic functions like CONTROL, 
MOVE, VOLITION etc. relate participants and subevents.
(v) Implication vs. presupposition'. The occurrence o f  a subevent is either 
entailed (—+j) or presupposed (—>P) by the open proposition in the se­
mantic translation o f  the verb, i.e. by an expression like “VERB(x,y,e)’\
This basic idea is illustrated by the following examples o f the German 
verbs abtrocknen ‘dry o f f , fahren  ‘drive’, erschießen ‘kill by shooting’, 
and fangen  ‘catch’.
The two-place verb abtrocknen ‘to dry o f f  refers to a complex event 
where the first subevent e has a certain duration (“DUR”), i. e., is not punc­
tual, and involves two participants, an agent and a patient. In Ron hat den 
Bierkrug abgetrocknet ‘Ron dried off the beer mug’, e1 is Ron’s acting 
upon the beer mug (probably with a towel). Almost simultaneously (“o”), a 
second durative event e2 occurs which only involves the patient, namely the 
beer mug becoming dry. This results in a following (“<”) state s o f the beer
2.2. Sketch of a theory of Lexical Event Structures
3 This section is a slightly modified version o f section 2.2 in Engelberg (2004). 
The relation to other theories o f lexical semantics like those by Pustejovsky
(1991) and Wunderlich (1996, 1997) is not touched on in the present paper. The 
reader is referred to Engelberg (2000a, 2001, 2004).
mug being dry. This is captured in the Lexical Event Structure (LES) of 
abtrocknen as in Lex 1. For simplicity, I will not list the particular semantic 
relations in most o f the following representations, but just speak o f agents 
and patients in a very unspecific way. I assume that these thematic relations 
are derived from more basic relations like ‘volition’, ‘change’, etc. within a 
prototype theory of thematic roles (cf. Dowty 1991; Blume 2000: 119ff; 
Engelberg 2000a: 156ff).
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abtrocknen SEM: XyXxX.e[ABTROCKN(x,y,e)]
LES: e l[+ D U R ]. XAGENT^ yPATIEN T) 0  (_ > .  ( g2 [+ D U R ]. yPATIENT)
< ( —♦,*: yPATIEN T)
Lex 1. Lexical entry for German transitive abtrocknen ‘dry o f f .
The causative but non-resultative verb fahren  ‘to drive’, as in sie fuhr ihren 
neuen Volkswagen ‘she drove her new Volkswagen’, requires a structure 
similar to causal resultatives like abtrocknen with the difference that it 
lacks a result state in its non-directional variant:
fahren SEM: XyÀxÀ.e[FAHR(x,y,e)]
LES: e l[+ D U R ]. XAGENT y  PATIENT^ 0 (_> ( e 2[+ D U R ]. yPATIEN Tj
Lex 2. Lexical entry for German transitive fahren  ‘drive’.
While the event structure properties o f causative erschießen ‘kill by shoot­
ing’, as in die Miliz erschoss den Demonstranten ‘the militia shot (and 
killed) the demonstrator’, are similar in many respects to those o f verbs like 
abtrocknen ‘to dry o f f , erschießen implies a different temporal relation 
between the causing and the caused subevent, since the causing subevent 
completely precedes the caused one, in contrast to abtrocknen. Further­
more, at least the first subevent is punctual:
erschießen SEM: XyX.xX.e[ERSCHlESS(x,y,e)]
LES: ( __> ! e l[+ P C T ]. XAGENT yPATIEN T) <  ( __ > ( g 2 . yPATIEN Tj
< ( - > • !  S: yPATIEN T)
Lex 3. Lexical entry for German transitive erschießen ‘kill by shooting’.
Finally, the verb fangen  ‘to catch’, in the sense o f ‘catch a flying object’, as 
in sie fing  den Ball ‘she caught the ball’, is distinct from the verbs above 
due to the presupposed rather than implied occurrence of the first subevent, 
i. e., we can still infer from the negated sentence sie fing  den Ball nicht ‘she 
didn’t catch the ball’ that the ball was flying:
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fangen SEM: X y X x X e [ F A N G ( x ,y ,e ) ]
LES: ( — » p  e l .  y  PATIENT) <  e 2[+PC T ]. XAGENT yPATIEN T)
<  ( _ >  j s ;  XAGENT^ yPATIEN T)
Lex 4. Lexical entry of German transitive fangen ‘catch’.
Lex 1 through Lex 4 are shorthand notations for more explicit semantic 
representations in which meaning postulates (MP) take the open proposi­
tion o f the verb’s translation, VERB(x,y,e), as an antecedent and the differ­
ent information parts o f LES as a consequent. These parts include the infor­
mation about immediate subevents in the form of a mereological condition, 
e. g., e1 C imm e,4 the sort o f each subevent as a one-place predicate, e. g., 
PCT(e;)> the semantic relations as two-place predicates between event par­
ticipants and subevents, e. g., CONTROL(jc, e1), and the temporal relations as 
two-place relations between subevents, e. g., e1 < e2. In addition, more spe­
cific information about the subevents can be given, e. g., that the first 
subevent o f fangen  ‘catch’ in Lex 4 is a flying or moving away o f some­
thing and the first subevent offahren  in Lex 2 involves the agent operating 
the mechanisms and controls o f the patient and directing its course. This 
specific information -  although part o f the meaning o f the lexical item -  is 
not crucial for the explanation o f the semantic and syntactic phenomena we 
are interested in. Thus, the shorthand notation o f fahren  ‘drive’ in Lex 2 
can be obtained from the full-blown representation in Lex 5.
Lex 5 also contains information about dependency relations between 
subevents like causation which are omitted in the short-hand notations be­
cause they don’t play a role in the explanation o f the phenomena discussed 
in later sections o f this paper. Three remarks are in order here with respect 
to dependency relations: (i) Every temporal relation within a Lexical Event 
Structure is accompanied by a dependency relation. Verbs do not denote 
events whose subevents are merely temporally connected, (ii) Causation is
4 The idea of what it means for a subevent to be an immediate subevent is elabo­
rated in Engelberg (2004).




MP-I -fahren: DVyVxyelTAHRix^e) —>p
(selectional retrictions:) ANIMATE(x) &
VEHICLE(y) & .. .  ]
MP-II-fahren'. □ V yV xV e[FA H R (x,y,e) 3 e '3 e 2 [
(subevents:) e l ç im m e &
¿2 O mm e &
(sort o f subevents:) DUR(e') &
DUR(e2) &
(temporal relations:) e 1 o e2 &
(causation:) CAUSE(e', e2)&
(semantic relations:) CONTROL(x, e 1) &
MOVE(y, e2) & ...
(specific information:) OPERATE-MECHANISMS&CONTROLS-
AND-DIRECT-COURSE(x, y , e 1) & ... ]]
Lex 5. Lexical entry (full-blown version) for German transitive fahren  ‘drive’ (for 
the ‘SYN’ information cf. section 3.1).
not the only dependency relation involved in verb semantics. The two im­
mediate subevents o f abtrocknen ‘dry o ff , namely the acting upon the mug 
and the becoming dry o f the mug, stand in a typical causal relation. Other 
verbs like vergeben ‘forgive’, gehorchen ‘obey\fo lg en  ‘follow’ or nachge- 
ben ‘give in’ imply relations which are more similar to concessive or expla­
natory relations as expressed by conjunctions like although or because (cf. 
Blume 2000: 167).5 If Rebecca forgives Rudolph, that means she decided to 
no longer be upset with him (—>¡ e2), although he did something mean to her 
(—>P e1). If  Rebecca obeys Rudolph she displayed a certain behavior (— e2) 
because (among other things) Rudolph told her to do so (—>P e1). Further­
more, in Engelberg (2005) it is argued that another non-causal dependency 
relation, namely supervenience, is involved with a number of verbs like help,
5 These relations are probably better conceived o f as relations between proposi­
tions or facts about these subevents. As with causation, I will not discuss their 
semantics here. Notice that non-causal dependency relations only occur between 
a presupposed and an implied subevent, but not between two implied subevents.
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endanger, facilitate. Supervenience is a counterfactual relation that holds 
between expressions like Rebecca helped Jamaal and Rebecca fixed  Ja- 
m aal’s computer where the event expressed in the second expression, so to 
speak, instantiates the event expressed in the first event without being identi­
cal to it. (iii) In contrast to the original version o f the event structure theory 
(Engelberg 2000a) I now tend to grant the different dependency relations a 
more important role in licensing certain constructions. Supervenience might 
be involved in licensing sentential subjects as in that he did that helped us a 
lot and verbs expressing concessive, explanatory, and similar relations 
show a striking proneness to mark their objects with dative case.
As with dependency relations, it also holds for temporal relations that 
verbs referring to complex events always impose temporal restrictions on 
the relation between the subevents. That is to say, there are no verbs that 
imply the occurrence o f several subevents and / or a state but do not imply 
a particular temporal relationship between them.
3. The licensing of semantic and syntactic structures
3.1. Lexical Event Structures and semantic restrictions
I assume that Lexical Event Structures are the core part in the lexical seman­
tic representation o f verbs, which underlies the behavior o f verbs in the five 
empirical domains mentioned in section 2.1. Other elements o f the meaning 
of a verb are considered irrelevant for these phenomena. While it is part of 
the meaning of to cough both that it is punctual and that it involves an expul­
sion o f air only punctuality is crucial in the explanation o f the verb’s gram­
matical and semantic behavior while the implied expulsion o f air is not. In 
the following I will provide examples from each o f the five empirical do­
mains and show how they depend on distinctions provided by Lexical Event 
Structures.
3.1.1. Semantics-syntax mapping
Besides the role Lexical Event Structures play in a general approach to 
linking, which will be dealt with in section 3.2, a number o f semantically 
motivated valency alternations have been treated on the basis of event struc­
ture representations. One of them is the alternation in (2) between an accusa­
tive NP in German and a PP headed by the preposition an ‘at’, which is said
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to introduce a partitive meaning (cf. Krifka 1989; Filip 1989; Engelberg 
1994). In particular, this alternation points to the relevance o f a distinction 
between durative and punctual events.
(2) a. Rebecca baute einen Schuppen / an einem Schuppen.
Rebecca built a.ACC shed / at a.DAT shed 
approximately: ‘Rebecca built / was building a shed.’
b. Rebecca streichelte ihren Leguan / *an ihrem Leguan.
‘Rebecca petted / was petting her iguana.’
c. Rebecca sprengte die Brücke / *an ihrer Brücke.
‘Rebecca blew up / was blowing up the bridge.’
d. Rebecca kniff ihren Freund / *an ihrem Freund.
‘Rebecca pinched / was pinching her boyfriend.’
As the examples in (2) show, it is only a subclass o f transitive verbs like 
those in (3 a) that allow the ««-construction, while other transitive verbs do 
not (3b).
(3) a. ««-construction possible: waschen, ‘wash’; schreiben, ‘write’;
bügeln, ‘iron’; reparieren ‘fix’6; stricken, ‘knit’; manipulieren, 
‘manipulate’; kochen, ‘cook’; rechnen, ‘calculate’; nähen, ‘sew’.
b. ««-construction not possible: kennen, ‘know’; quälen, ‘tease / 
torture’; photographieren, ‘photograph’; sehen, ‘see’; sprengen, 
‘blow up’; stehlen, ‘steal’; lösen, ‘solve’.
The ««-alternation turns out to be restricted to verbs which express an event 
o f a certain duration that leads to a result state (2a). Neither durative verbs 
without a result state (2b) nor punctual verbs either with (2c) or without a 
result state (2d) are admissible here.7
6 The ««-construction is particularly often found with verbs o f creation like bauen 
‘build’, schreiben ‘write’, etc., but examples for verbs of change o f state like re­
parieren ‘fix’ are also attested: Musste zwar etwas warten, weil der C hef gerade 
Kundschaft hatte, er reparierte an einem C5, wurde aber gefragt, ob ich Kaffee 
möchte ‘Had to wait a little bit, because the boss had a client, he “fixed at a” C5, 
but was asked if  I would like a coffee’ (from the internet).
7 There is also a morphological restriction, in that derived verbs do not take part in 
the alternation, i. e. verbs converted from adjectives (trocknen, ‘to dry’), prefixed 
verbs (ver\nähen, ‘to close by sewing’), and verbs with separable particles 
(her\stellen, ‘to produce’). That morphological restrictions are involved also 
points to the lexical nature o f this valency alternation.
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It should be noted that the two interpretations o f bauen in (2a) -  the com­
pletive and the partitive one -  do not require two different Lexical Event 
Structures for bauen. Since verbs are subject to the influence of grammati­
cal aspect and aspectual meanings can have a modal component, the result 
state within an LES can be within the scope o f a modal operator which ren­
ders the result state as just possibly obtaining. This has been argued for 
with respect to the progessive in Engelberg (2002b).
Other phenomena within the domain o f valency alternations that have 
been discussed within this approach are the intransitive verb passive (cf. 
section 4.2.), the realization of the agent in German passive constructions 
which use bleiben ‘remain’ as an auxiliary (cf. Engelberg 2004), and causa- 
tivization processes with verbs denoting sounds and noises (cf. Engelberg 
2000a: 288ff).
3.1.2. Selectional restrictions
Adverbial modification o f verbs requires the right semantic representation 
of verbs insofar as many adverbials semantically select verbs that denote 
events o f a particular kind. Moreover, a theory that assumes verbs to refer 
to structured events suggests that adverbials are attracted to particular sub­
events. That will be illustrated by two examples. The first one, which is taken 
from Engelberg (2000b), starts from the observation that German has two 
temporal-aspectual adverbials corresponding to English PPs o f the type fo r  
five  minutes, namely fü n f  Minuten lang (literally “five minutes long”) and 
fü r  fü n f  Minuten (literally “for five minutes”). The latter is particularly in­
teresting since it shows that the involvement of event participants in particu­
lar subevents plays a crucial role. A corpus-based investigation revealed that, 
firstly, the fü r-PP in by far the most cases refers to a result state o f an event 
and, secondly, that in almost all cases, the fü r-PP occurs if the result state is 
controlled by the agent as in the examples (4a) and (4b) where ‘for’ is in­
tended to refer to the length of the result state and not the preceding activ­
ity / If demonstrators block a street (4a), the result state o f the street being
8 The notion o f controlled states seems to play a role in other domains, too. In a 
study on nominalized infinitives in German, Blume (2004: 112) observed that 
verbs denoting states allow nominalized infinitives only if  these states are con­
trolled by an animate participant. Similarly, the realization o f an agent with cer­
tain kinds o f stative passives requires agentive control over an result state (cf. 
Engelberg 2004).
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blocked will hold as long as the demonstrators maintain this state, while the 
state that results from loosing a key (4c) is not controlled by the agent.
(4) a. Sie blockierten die Straße fur eine Stunde.
‘They blocked the street for one hour.’
b. Sie besetzten die Fabrik fur drei Tage.
‘They occupied the factory for three days.’
c . ?? Sie verlor den Schlüssel für einige Minuten.
‘She lost the key for five minutes.’
d. ’ Sie aß den Apfel für eine Stunde.
‘She ate the apple for one hour.’
This restriction is captured in lexical entries like Lex 6:
besetzen SEM: X,yXxXe[BESETZ(x,y,e)]
LES: ( _ > J  e l .  XAGENT y  PATIENT)
<  S ' x AGENT(CONTROL, . . .  yPATIEN T)
Lex 6. Lexical entry for German transitive besetzen ‘occupy’.
As (4) has shown, adverbials are sensitive for the distinction between proc- 
ess-like and stative parts o f the event. Similarly, in cases where a verb re­
fers to an event with two non-stative subevents, adverbials usually clearly 
relate to one o f them. In the following example (from Engelberg 2004) each 
of the two adverbial PPs headed by mit ‘with’ is related to a different part 
of the event, as the respective implications show.
(5) a. Otto fuhr den Wagen mit großem Vergnügen.
‘Otto drove the car with great pleasure.’
implies: Otto was doing something with great pleasure,
does not imply: The car was moving with great pleasure.
b. Otto fuhr den Wagen mit Höchstgeschwindigkeit.
‘Otto drove the car at highest speed.’
does not imply: Otto was doing something at highest speed, 
implies: The car was moving at highest speed.
If we assume that there are two subevents involved here (cf. Lex 2, section 
2.2), namely a causing subevent e1 (Otto operating the car) and a caused
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subevent e2 (the car moving), the difference between (5a) and (5b) finds an 
explanation. The first adverbial, mit großem Vergnügen ‘with great pleas­
ure’, modifies e1, and the second one, mit Höchstgeschwindigkeit ‘at high­
est speed’, modifies e2. This relativization with respect to subevents is 
grounded in selectional restrictions. The adverbial mit großem Vergnügen 
only modifies (sub)events with an animate participant, while mit Höchst­
geschwindigkeit in the context o f movements is more likely to occur with 
inanimate event participants. This behavior of adverbials, in particular 
manner adverbials, can be generalized: an event adverbial can modify any 
subevent whose occurrence is implied by the verb -  i. e. presupposed 
subevents are not modifiable -  and which satisfies the selectional restric­
tions o f the adverbial.
3.1.3. Grammatical-categorical restrictions
The formal contrasts within most grammatical categories can be systemati­
cally expressed with all words o f the part o f speech they are defined for, e. g. 
with respect to tense each verb can occur in past, present or future tense if  a 
language has grammatical markers for these contrasts. Some grammatical 
categories, though, employ contrasts that are restricted to a subset o f the 
lexemes o f the respective part of speech. This holds for plural as an expres­
sion o f the grammatical category number, for progressive as one o f the as­
pects or passive within the category o f voice. In most cases lexical semantic 
properties are responsible for these restrictions. Thus, Lexical Event Struc­
tures should capture these properties, which they do, as will be shown for 
lexical restrictions concerning the progressive (cf. Engelberg 2004). Leav­
ing aside restrictions on stative verbs for the moment, an observation which 
points to the importance of both the distinction between durative and punc­
tual verbs and between presupposed and entailed subevents is the following: 
while all durative verbs (with and without result states) allow the progres­
sive, for punctual verbs there are occurrence and interpretation restrictions. 
Firstly, punctual verbs can occur in the progressive if  they are non-result- 
ative; in this case they are interpreted iteratively (6). Secondly, punctual 
verbs that presuppose a preceding event occur in the progressive, as in (7), 
where it is presupposed that Rebecca participated in the race or was nearing 
the completion o f her journey, respectively. In this case, the progressive 
sentence is related to the time of this preceding event. Finally, punctual 
verbs that do not belong to these two types -  especially those that lead to
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cognitive states -  do not allow the progressive. This holds for notice and 
astonish in (8) which are resultative in the sense that once somebody has 
noticed something, he is aware o f it, and once something has astonished 
somebody, he is in a state o f surprise.
(6) a. Rebecca was pinching Jamaal. (—> repeatedly)
b. Rebecca was hopping. (—> repeatedly)
(7) a. Rebecca was winning the race,
b. Rebecca was arriving.
(8) a . ?? Rebecca was noticing that.
b .?? That was astonishing Rebecca.
The Lexical Event Structures o f the three types o f verbs display these prop­




e l[+ P C T ]: XACENT)
Lex 7. Lexical entry for English intransitive hop.
win SEM: XyXxXe[wiN(x,y,e)]
LES: ( — > p  e l[+ D U R ]. XAGENT yPATIENT)
<  e 2[+ PC T ]. XAGENT yPATIENT)
Lex 8. Lexical entry for English transitive win.
notice SEM: ?iyX,xX.e[NOTlCE(x,y,e)]
LES: ( _ > !  e l[P C T ]. XAGENT yPATIENT)
<  s - x AGENT yPATIEN Tj
Lex 9. Lexical entry for English transitive notice.
9 It would have to be shown that the arguments o f win and notice in fact bear the 
roles indicated in their event structures. The x argument o f win, for example, has 
sometimes been treated as non-agentive (e.g., Pustejovsky 1991: 61). I will not 
argue for any particular solution here, since the precise roles and the underlying 
semantic entailments are not relevant for the phenomena discussed.
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3.1.4. Interlexematic relations
Semantic relations between lexemes like synonymy, antonymy or hypony- 
my, which I will call interlexematic relations, constitute the classical field 
for lexical semantics. Expressions like German durchwaten ‘wade across’ 
vs. durchqueren ‘move across’ (9) and French verdir ‘color green’ vs. col­
orer ‘color’ (10) stand in a relation o f hyponymy. Every event o f wading 
across (durchwaten) is a an event o f moving across (durchqueren), but not 
the other way around, and every event o f coloring something green (verdir) 
is an event of coloring something (colorer), but not the other way around.
(9) a. Rebecca durchquerte den See.
‘Rebecca moved across the lake / crossed the lake.’
b. Rebecca durchwatete den See.
‘Rebecca crossed the lake by wading / waded through the lake.’
(10) a. Jamaal a coloré le carré.
‘Jamaal colored the square.’ 
b. Jamaal a verdi le carré.
‘Jamaal colored / made the square green.’
There is a crucial difference between these two pairs, though, which be­
comes obvious when we look at the event structures of the respective verbs. 
Durchwaten and durchqueren involve a process e1 that leads to the result 
state s o f being across (Lex 10) and verdir and colorer involve a first sub­
event e1 where somebody causes a second subevent e2 of something chang­
ing its color with the result state 5 that the object has a new color (Lex 11).
durchwaten SEM: X.yÀ.x>te[DURCHWATEN(x,y,e)]
LES: (  , | g  1 [D UR]. XAGENT yPATIEN T)
<  s . XAGENT yPATIEN T)
Lex 10. Lexical entry for German transitive durchwaten ‘wade through’ (for e1 
being the wading of x through y ).10
10 In section 4.2 I will argue that we actually have to distinguish two agentive 
subevents with verbs of movement, a translatory movement (in (9) across the 
lake) and a relative movement (in the case of durchwaten the particular wading 
movements of the agent). This refinement does not affect the possibility of rela- 
tivizing the interlexematic relations with respect to subevents.
A theory o f  Lexical Event Structures and its cognitive motivation 2 5 1
verdir SEM: X.yX,xXe[VERDIR(x,y,e)]
LES: (  , j g l .  x  AG ENT yPATIEN T) 0  (  ,  ¿ 1 . yPATIEN T) 
<  ( _ > J  s ;  yPATIENT)
Lex 11. Lexical entry for French transitive verdir ‘color / make green’ (for 5 being 
the state of y  having the color green).
For the colorer-verdir pair the hyponymy relation is related to the result 
state, since the result state o f verdir is a specific case o f the result state of 
colorer. By contrast, for the durchwaten-durchqueren pair the hyponymy 
relation is related to the agentive subevent, since the activity o f durchwaten 
is a special form of durchqueren, while the result o f being on the other side 
is the same for both verbs. By referring to structured events, we can refine 
and relativize the idea o f hyponymy / hyperonymy as follows: (i) The verb 
durchqueren is a hyperonym of durchwaten with respect to the agentive 
subevent e1 because all properties o f e1 which can be inferred from durch­
queren can also be inferred from durchwaten with respect to its agentive 
subevent e'1. It follows from durchqueren that the agent moves somehow in 
e1. The same follows from durchwaten with respect to e'1, but where durch­
waten also implies that the agent moves in a way that he lifts his legs 
higher than one usually does when walking on solid ground, (ii) The verb 
colorer is a hyperonym of verdir with respect to the result state s because 
all the properties o f s which can be inferred from colorer can also be in­
ferred from verdir with respect to its result state s'. It follows from colorer 
that the colored object has a different color than before. The same follows 
from verdir with respect to s', but verdir also implies that the new color of 
the object is green.
It should be noticed that colorer can actually not be conceived of as a 
hyperonym o f verdir with respect to the whole event. While colorer is typi­
cally used with animate subject referents, verdir allows uses with non- 
animate subject referents in which verdir can not always be replaced by 
colorer. Thus, only the relativized notion o f hyperonymy/hyponymy allows 
us to capture the particular relationship between verbs like colorer ‘color’, 
teindre ‘dye’, andpeindre ‘paint’ on the one hand and verdir ‘make green’, 
bleuir ‘make blue’, jaunir  ‘make yellow’ on the other which only holds 
with respect to the result state.
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3.1.5. Inference behavior
If two sentences just differ with respect to a certain grammatical category or 
are related by a certain kind o f diathesis (e. g. progressive vs. non-progres­
sive or active vs. stative passive), these sentences also differ systematically 
with respect to certain inferences. But often there is in addition a lexical 
property that interferes with this systematic inferential pattern (cf. Engel- 
berg 2000a: 54ff). This is, for example, the case with the relation between 
causative and inchoative variants o f verbs. It has often been observed that a 
sentence containing the causative variant o f a verb systematically entails the 
corresponding sentence with the inchoative verb variant (11). Interestingly, 
the entailment relation between the causative and the inchoative variant 
does not always hold if  the verbs are put in the progressive form (12). It 
doesn’t hold for (12b) because Rebecca might have been interrupted while 
felling the tree, in which case the tree might never have been falling.
(11) a. Rebecca dried her hair. —* Her hair dried,
b. Rebecca felled the tree. —► The tree fell.
(12) a. Rebecca was drying her hair. —*• Her hair was drying,
b. -■ [Rebecca was felling the tree. —> The tree was falling.]
The different inference behavior in (12) is due to semantic peculiarities of 
the verb dry on the one hand and fe ll  on the other. With dry the temporal 
relation between the causing event (Rebecca acting upon her hair) and the 
caused event (her hair drying) can be conceived o f as temporally parallel or 
overlapping as with abtrocknen ‘dry o f f  in Lex 1 (section 2.2). This tem­
poral relation does not hold with fell', the causing event (Rebecca acting 
upon the tree) precedes the caused event (the tree falling). This pecularity 
offe ll is captured in Lex 12.
fell SEM: X.y>i.xX.e[FELL(x,y,e)]
LES: e l[+ D U R ]; XAGENT^ yPATIEN T)
<  ( _ » J  e 2[+ PC T ]; yPATIEN T) <  ( _ > |  S ; y  PATIENT)
Lex 12. Lexical entry for English transitive fell.
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3.2. Lexical Event Structures and linking
3.2.1. General assumptions about valency and linking
Lexical Event Structures were developed in a project that was mainly con­
cerned with the syntactic and semantic valency o f words. A number o f ba­
sic assumptions have guided the work in our project, which I will briefly 
present here in order to enhance the understanding o f the linking approach 
to be presented in the remainder of this section.
At the core o f the project lies the ‘Multidimensional Theory o f Valency’ 
which distinguishes four core dimensions o f valency.11
(i) Form specificity: A phrase is form-specific for a predicate P if it real­
izes a syntactic feature (in particular a case or a selected preposition) 
required by P.
(ii) Obligatoriness'. A phrase is obligatory for P, if P requires its realization.
(iii) Argumenthood: A phrase is an argument o f a predicate P if  it specifies 
an open variable in the meaning representation o f P.
(iv) Content specificity (selectional restrictions): A phrase is content-specific 
for a predicate P if it has a semantic feature that is required by P.
The first two constitute the syntactic valency o f a word and the last two the 
semantic valency. The notation employed to describe these valency dimen­
sions is exemplified in the lexical entry Lex 13. The verb aufwecken ‘wake 
up’ has two variables for argument positions x and y, and the expression 
which specifies y  is content-specific in the sense that it has to refer to an 
animate being. Both arguments are obligatory -  otherwise there would be a 
second lexical entry representing the intransitive Inom variant -  and have to 
be realized as accusative and nominative NPs, respectively. For details, e. 
g. why these cases are not considered to be structural cases and why op- 
tionality requires a second lexical entry, cf. Jacobs (1993, 2003), Engelberg 
(2000a: 116ff, 2002a).
11 The theory goes back to Jacobs (1994a, 1992a, 2003) and is worked out in sev­
eral books and articles, the most notable being Jacobs (1992b) on the processing 
of syntactic valencies, Jacobs (1993, 1994b), Blume (1993) and Engelberg 
(2002a) on implicit arguments, as well as the work discussed in the course of 
this section. Besides the four core dimensions other valency dimensions have 
also been employed, among others ‘participation’ (whether a referent o f a phrase 




Lex 13. Lexical entry for the two-place German verb aufwecken, ‘wake up’.
The valency dimensions are independent o f each other. No two o f them nec­
essarily occur together, e. g. a phrase can be form-specific without being 
obligatory (13a,b) or obligatory without being form-specific (13c,d), etc.
(13) a. Das half ihm / *ihn.





d. Er wohnte dort / luxuriös / in Wuppertal.
‘He lived (resided) there / luxuriously / in Wuppertal.’
Linking is understood as the coindexation o f the lambda-prefixed semantic 
argument variable o f a predicate with positions in the syntactic valency de­
scription o f the predicate, and is thus explicitly specified in the lexicon as 
in Lex 14. In the following I will omit these indices and present syntactic 
and semantic valency in aligned order, where the first position in the se­
mantic valency corresponds to the first position in the syntactic valency and 
so on.
verschlingen SYN: /acc2/nom'
SEM: Xy2Xx1 À.e[VERSCHLlNG(x,y ,e)]
Lex 14. Lexical entry for German verschlingen, ‘devour’.
Linking rules are understood as restrictions for co-indexations of the de­
scribed sort. They do not predict unambiguously which arguments relate to 
which syntactic cases. What they do tell us is which syntactic valencies are 
universally possible for a verb with a particular meaning, that is to say, they 
predict with respect to the syntactic and semantic valency information which 
lexical entries can occur in human languages. E.g., for a verb bearing the 
meaning XyX.xX.e[FOLLOW(x,y,e)] the theory will predict that lexical entries
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linking y  either to dative or to accusative case are possible, w hile for a verb 
meaning XyXxXe[DEVOUR(x,y,e)] a lexical entry linking y  to dative case 
w ill be universally ruled out.
3.2.2. Linking and marked valencies
In the linking approach pursued by us and worked out in Blume (1998, 
2000), it is assumed that some valencies are more marked than others. In an 
unmarked valency (i) each semantic argument position is linked to a differ­
ent syntactic case and (ii) each case in the universal case hierarchy in (14) 
is only included in the syntactic valency description if  every higher ranked 
case is also included (Blume 1998, 2000: 148ff, based on Primus 1994).
(14) nominative/absolutive > accusative/ergative > dative > genitive > 
other cases
The degree o f markedness o f the syntactic valency increases with the num­
ber o f these conditions that are violated. Thus, Inomlacc and lerglabs are un­
marked, Inomldat and labsldat are slightly marked, lergldat is more marked 
(since both case specifications violate condition (ii) and Igenlgen is ex­
tremely marked (and probably not attested in natural languages) (Blume 
2000: 221). The more marked a valency is, the more rarely it is found in 
natural languages, e. g. labsldat valencies are much more frequent than 
lergldat valencies.
Starting from these assumptions, Blume (2000), investigating 11 lan­
guages from the Indo-European, Finno-Ugric and Austronesian language 
families, answers two questions: (i) How are marked syntactic valencies 
licensed? (ii) How are the arguments o f marked and unmarked valencies 
linked to their respective cases?
As far as the first question goes, the data suggest that crosslinguistically 
unmarked valency patterns can be found with verbs o f any semantic class, 
whereas marked valencies can be found only with verbs that fulfill certain 
semantic conditions. At first sight, though, the group o f verbs showing up 
with marked valencies seems rather heterogeneous. Looking only at Ger­
man verbs with the marked Inomldat valency, at least five groups emerge 
and are dealt with in Blume (2000): verbs o f interaction, psych- and percep­
tion verbs, unaccusative verbs, verbs o f possession, and certain kinds of 
stative verbs. Despite this heterogeneity, what Blume (2000: 180ff) identi­
fies as the licensing condition for marked syntactic valencies o f two-place
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verbs is limited semantic transitivity. That is to say, neither verbs that are 
transitive to a high degree, nor verbs with a particularly low degree o f tran­
sitivity allow marked syntactic valencies. The notion o f transitivity as well 
as the linking principle are based on a prototype approach to thematic roles 
in the vein o f Dowty (1991). As we have seen in section 2.2, semantic rela­
tions connect subevents and event participants. In Blume’s (2000: 169f) ap­
proach, one set o f these entailed relations characterizes a prototypical agent 
and another set a prototypical patient. The proto-agent properties are (i) 
CONTROL o f the subevent, (ii) SENTIENCE with respect to the subevent, (iii) 
pursuing a particular interest or INTENTION with respect to a subevent, and
(iv) exhibiting ACTIVITY or a particular function. Among these entailments 
ACTIVITY and the combination of CONTROL and INTENTION are considered 
to be particularly “potent” proto-agent properties. The proto-patient proper­
ties are (i) being CONTROLLED by another participant in a subevent, and (ii) 
being AFFECTED by the physical or mental impact o f another participant. 
Participants which do not entail any proto-agent or proto-patient entail­
ments with respect to a subevent are marked as THEMATIC.
Blume’s concept o f semantic transitivity is characterized by four proper­
ties (Blume 2000: 186). A verb is semantically transitive if  (i) it has at least 
two distinct argument positions, (ii) at least one argument is a participant in 
the event, (iii) at least one argument has potent proto-role properties, and
(iv) there is a clear asymmetry between the two arguments with respect to 
the distribution o f proto-role properties. The more o f these criteria apply, 
the more transitive the verb is. A verb is said to be o f limited transitivity if 
the first three o f these conditions are fulfilled but not the last one, i. e. there 
is no clear asymmetry in the distribution o f proto-roles. This kind o f limited 
semantic transitivity is what licenses marked syntactic valencies.
A few examples will show how this condition cuts the right piece out of 
the verbal lexicon. Verbs like essen ‘eat’ fulfill all the transitivity conditions 
in having two arguments standing for event participants with potent proto­
role properties and a clear asymmetry between proto-agent properties for 
the subject and proto-patient properties for the object. A verb like sich ver­
späten ‘be late’ as a syntactically two-place verb with an expletive reflexive 
violates condition (i), a verb like kosten ‘cost’ where both arguments do not 
realize event participants violates condition (ii), and a verb like besitzen 
‘own’ violates condition (iii) in not exhibiting any proto-role properties for 
one o f its arguments. All o f these verbs typically have unmarked valencies; 
in German they are /nom/acc-verbs. In the case o f verbs like essen, this is 
due to high transitivity, in the other cases due to low transitivity.
Three Inomldat verbs will serve here to illustrate the case o f limited transi­
tivity, the perception verb schmecken ‘taste (good)’, the interaction verb 
folgen  ‘follow’ and the two-place unaccusative zerbrechen ‘break’ (cf. also 
Blume 2000: 19 Iff):
(15) a. Die Suppe schmeckte ihm.
the soup.NOM tasted (good) he. DAT 
‘The soup tasted good to him.’
b. Sie folgte dem Mann. 
she.NOM followed the man.DAT 
‘She followed the m an.’
c. Die Vase zerbrach ihm. 
the vase.NOM broke he.DAT 
‘The vase (went and) broke on him. /
He inadvertently caused the vase to break. ’
The verb schmecken, which is event-structurally simple and has two event 
participants, implies SENTIENCE for the person doing the tasting, but exhib­
its no other proto-role properties. Thus, there is only a weak asymmetry of 
proto-role properties indicating limited transitivity (Lex 15).12
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schmecken SYN: /nom/dat
SEM: XyÀxXe[SCHMECK(x,y,e)]
LES: e  1 [+D U R]. X SENTIENCE y  THEMATIC)
Lex 15. Lexical entry for German schmecken ‘taste (good)’.
Verbs o f interaction like folgen  ‘follow’, antworten ‘answer’, nachgeben 
‘give in’, trotzen ‘defy’, etc. are characterized by a presupposed subevent, in 
which one o f the two participants acts (moves away, asks something, exerts 
pressure, etc.) and a second overlapping implied subevent in which the 
other participant acts. The distribution of proto-role properties is obviously 
not asymmetric while all the other transitivity conditions are fulfilled. Thus, 
the marked valency is licensed.
12 The Lexical Event Structures o f the verbs illustrated here slightly deviate from 





LES: ( _ » p  e  1 [+D Ü R]. y A C T IV IT Y /...)  0  ( e 2[+D U R ]. XACTIVITY/.. . )
Lex 16. Lexical entry for German folgen  ‘follow’.
Finally, the unaccusative two-place zerbrechen ‘break’ (and similarly for 
verbs like verrotten ‘rot’ or iiberkochen ‘boil over’) expresses that some 
object x breaks as a consequence o f some presupposed event the other par­
ticipant y  was involved in and that the breaking o f x  is to the disadvantage 
o f y. Since y  neither intends nor controls the breaking of x  and x  exhibits 
none o f the two proto-patient properties, there is only a slight asymmetry in 
proto-role properties, such that the marked valency is licensed.
zerbrechen SYN: /nom/dat
SEM: Xy^x>te[ZERBRECH(x,y,e)]
LES: e l. x  ACTIVITY^ y  THEMATIC)
<  e 2[+ PC T ]. y  THEMATIC) <  s ;  y  THEMATIC)
Lex 17. Lexical entry for the two-place variant o f German zerbrechen ‘break’.
The licensing condition for marked valencies explains which verbs can oc­
cur with Inomldat and other unmarked valency patterns. What it doesn’t tell 
us, though, is which argument in the semantic valency description has to be 
linked to which case in the syntactic valency description. This is accom­
plished by a two-part universal linking principle.
(16) Universal Linking Principle
(A) For unmarked valencies: (i) The argument which exhibits potent 
proto-agent properties in the first implied subevent will become 
nominative or ergative, (ii) The argument which has the most 
proto-patient properties and the least proto-agent properties will 
become accusative or absolutive.
(B) For marked valencies: The argument which exhibits potent proto­
agent properties in the first implied subevent will receive the 
highest ranked case in its syntactic valency.
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The linking principle for unmarked valencies not only predicts the distribu­
tion o f cases for two-place verbs but also for three-place verbs, e. g. for 
those denoting ‘giving’ events (Lex 18, ex. 17a). The giver in Basque eman 
‘give’ appears in ergative case since it has potent proto-agent properties in 
the initial subevent, the given object occurs as an absolutive NP since it has 
the least proto-agent properties, while the recipient, which has agentive 
properties in the second ‘receiving’ subevent, gets the dative as the remain­
ing case o f the syntactic valency o f the verb.
eman SYN: /abs/dat/erg
SEM: XzXyXxXe[EMAN(x,y,z,e)]
LES: ( —►p e l-  x ACTIVITY/CONTROL yAFFECTED ^  AFFECTED)
<  ( —»j e 2 . y  ACTIVITY/CONTROL^ ZAFFECTED)
<  ( _ >  1 s - yTHEMATIC ZTHEMATIC)
Lex 18. Lexical entry for Basque eman ‘give’.
(17) a. Zuek lagunei opari poliak ematen
You.PL:ERG friend.PL:DAT present nice.PL:ABS give.IMPF
dizkiezue.
3:ABS.have.DAT.PL:ABS.3:PL:DAT.2:PL:ERG 
‘You always give nice presents to your friends.’
(Joppen & Wunderlich 1995: 129)
b. Oku ou muimui ‘i he ka.13
p r o g  I.a b s  follow d a t ( o b l ) d e t  car
‘I am following the car.’ (Chung 1978: 54)
For verbs with marked valencies, Blume’s linking principle correctly predicts 
that interaction verbs like German folgen  ‘follow’ (Lex 16), Tongan muimui
‘follow’ (Lex 19, ex. 17b) or Hungarian fe le l ‘answer’ (Lex 20, where it is
presupposed that y  asks x something), whose distribution o f proto-role 
properties is often completely symmetric, link the proto-agent in the im­
plied subevent to the highest ranked case in the syntactic valency, which is 
absolutive for muimui and nominative for fe le l (cf. also Blume 1998).
13 1 follow Blume (2000: 204) here in naming the subject case with intransitive 
verbs in Basque ‘absolutive’ (‘nominative’ in other sources) and the non-erga- 




LES: e l[+ D U R ]. yACTIVITY/CONTROL... )
< 0  ( — e 2[+D U R ]. x ACTIVITY/CONTROL... )
Lex 19. Lexical entry for Tongan muimui ‘follow’.
felel SYN: /dat/nom
SEM: XyXxXe[FELEL(x,y,e)]
LES: (  , e l .  yACTIVITY/CONTROL x THEMATIC)
<  ( _ >  i e 2 . x  ACTIVITY/CONTROL y  THEMATIC)
Lex 20. Lexical entry for Hungarian felel ‘answer’.
Verbs o f uncontrolled perception like schmecken ‘taste (good)’ (Lex 15) as 
well as stative psych-verbs do not exhibit potent proto-role properties. 
Since these verbs license marked valencies and the distribution o f proto­
role properties does not force one o f the arguments to occur in a particular 
case, marked and unmarked valencies with the stimulus or the experiencer 
in nominative or ergative (for unmarked valencies) or the highest available 
case (for marked valencies) are to be expected. This is borne out by the fact 
that in many languages these verbs come in pairs with converse case assign­
ments (e. g. German mögen ‘like’, Inomlacc, vs. gefallen ‘please’ Idatlnom).
Languages differ as to how widely they use the options provided by the 
licensing conditions for unmarked valencies. According to Blume (2000: 
200), in languages like Czech and Finnish, verbs o f limited semantic transi­
tivity often occur with marked valencies, while Romanian prefers unmark­
ed valencies.
It should be noted that Blume’s approach avoids the conceptual prob­
lems emerging from theories which assume that cases are either completely 
predictable from argument structure (structural cases) or are completely 
idiosyncratic (lexical cases), as is often assumed for the dative with two- 
place verbs. In contrast, Blume’s theory just restricts the possible valency 
frames for verbs with a given meaning, correctly predicting that certain 
verbs can assume a /nom/dat pattern in one language and a Inomlacc pat­
tern in another, yet still accounting for the non-arbitrariness o f the Inomldat 
(or any other marked) valency option.14
14 Cf. Blume’s (2000: 91 ff) discussion of approaches to the dative in generative 
syntax and Lexical Decomposition Grammar.
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Another valency phenomenon whose explanation is linked to Lexical Event 
Structure is the selection of genitive objects. Lenz (1998) argues that the 
complexity o f an event structure affects the way in which verbs that select 
genitive objects in German change their valency pattern. The genitive is 
loosing ground in German as a marker of arguments o f verbs. With some 
two-place verbs, it is still used as the only possible marker for the second 
argument, with other verbs the genitive object alternates either with an accu­
sative, a dative or a prepositional object. Lenz (1998: 18ff) shows that verbs 
which exhibit a complex event structure, i. e. one with more than one sub­
event, either retain the genitive or change to dative-selecting verbs, but never 
replace the genitive object by an accusative or prepositional one. Cf. the 
following examples: with entbehren ‘lack’ (18a), which denotes an event 
with a simple structure consisting of just one stative subevent (—►] s), the 
genitive nowadays often gets replaced by accusative. In contrast, erwehren 
‘resist, ward o f f  (18b) displays a complex event structure (—>P e1 < — e2), 
where some kind o f attack or pressure is presupposed. Accordingly, if the 
genitive gets replaced, it is the dative case which usually takes its place. 
Furthermore, these genitive-to-dative verbs conform to Blume’s (2000) li­
censing conditions for marked valencies since entbehren is charcterized by 
low transitivity and thus changes to an unmarked valency pattern while er­
wehren is o f limited transitivity -  with two agentive participants there is no 
clear asymmetry in the distribution o f proto-roles -  and therefore prefers 
the marked dative pattern.
(18) a. Sie entbehrt in dieser Situation
she.NOM lacks in this situation
seines Trostes /  seinen Trost. 
his comfort.GEN /  his comfort.ACC 
‘She lacks his comfort in this situation.’ 
b. Sie erwehrt sich seines Angriffs /  seinem  Angriff.
She.NOM wards o f f  REFL his attack.GEN /  his attack.DAT
‘She wards o ff  his attack.’ (Lenz 1998: 18ff)
Another phenomenon that fits well with Blume’s predictions is illustrated in
(19). Some Icelandic double-accusative verbs like bresta and vanta ‘lack’ 
alternate with either Inomldat or laccldat valencies. These diachronically 
more recent valency patterns are less marked than the lacclacc variant, 
which violates both requirements for unmarked valency (no case doubling, 
obey case hierarchy), but Blume’s theory correctly predicts that both verbs 
still prefer a marked syntactic valency pattern since they are characterized 
by limited transitivity.
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(19) a. Mig brestur kjark. /M er brestur kjarkur.
me.ACC lacks courage.ACC / me.DAT lacks courage.NOM
‘I lack courage.’ 
b. M ig vantar hnif. /  Mer vantar hnif.
me.ACC lacks knife.ACC / me.DAT lacks knife.ACC
‘I lack a knife.’ (Smith 1994: 683)
Thus, Lexical Event Structures have proven essential for the explanation of 
the occurrence o f marked valency patterns and for the rules linking argu­
ments to syntactic cases in the lexical specification of verbs. In particular, 
the structuring o f an event into subevents, the semantic relations between 
participants and subevents, and the distinction between implied and pre­
supposed subevents have played an important role here.
4. Cognitive foundation of the predicates and sortal distinctions of 
the semantic metalanguage
4.1. The granularity o f events
4.1.1. Coarse-grained and fine-grained events
In event semantics, the notion o f ‘event’ pertains to one o f the basic onto­
logical sorts besides e. g. individuals and propositions. Opinions differ as to 
whether the introduction of events as a basic ontological sort is sufficiently 
justified by its semantic necessity or whether a clear account o f what it 
means to be an event has to be given. I have argued elsewhere (Engelberg 
2000a: 215ff, 2001) that an exploration into the nature of events independ­
ently o f their semantic usefulness enhances the empirical soundness o f the 
semantic theory considerably. Following a long tradition in analytic phi­
losophy, I assume that the nature of a basic ontological sort of entities can 
best be revealed by establishing a criterion of identity for this sort. Such a 
criterion states the conditions under which two variables el and e2 stand for 
the same entity. It thereby follows Quine’s (1982: 102) principle ‘no entity 
without identity’ which encompasses the idea that the concept o f entity as 
something that can be quantified over has to come with a clear idea o f how 
an entity o f a given sort can be distinguished from another entity o f this sort 
or, in other words, whether e1 and e2 count as 2 or as l . 15
15 Detailed event ontological discussions can be found in Bennett (1988), Stoecker
(1992), Engelberg (2000a), and Eckardt (2002).
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Identity criteria for events have been established between two poles. On the 
one hand, events have been conceived o f as concrete thing-like individuals 
(e.g. by Quine 1976 and Lemmon 1967). In this case an event e (described 
in a particular way) and an event e2 (described in a particular way) are iden­
tical if  e takes place at the same time and at the same place as e2. This is a 
coarse-grained conception o f events, since many events that are distin­
guished under other conceptions o f events are lumped together. E. g., if 
there is an event el described as a rotating o f a metal ball from 4 to 5 
o ’clock and an event e2 described as a heating up of the same metal ball 
from 4 to 5 o ’clock, e' and e2 are identical under this event conception.
On the other hand, there are identity criteria which take events to be 
more abstract entities (cf. e.g. Kim 1976). They either don’t clearly distin­
guish between events and propositions or conceive of events as having at 
least a strong propositional flavor. In this case, an identity criterion could 
require that e1 and e2 are identical if the same individuals are involved in el 
and e2 and the same event properties are predicated over e l and e2. This is a 
fine-grained conception o f events that yields more events than a coarse­
grained one. E. g., if  there is an event e' described as the rotating of a metal 
ball from 4 to 5 o ’clock and an event e2 described as the fast rotating of the 
same metal ball from 4 to 5 o ’clock, then e1 and e2 are different events be­
cause ‘rotating’ and ‘fast rotating’ are different event properties. Events 
wouldn’t be distinguished, though, by different descriptions o f the involved 
objects: e' as the rotating of a metal ball x  from 4 to 5 o ’clock and e2 as the 
rotating o f the red metal ball x  from 4 to 5 o ’clock would still be identical.
In Engelberg (2000a) I have argued in length that neither overly coarse­
grained event conceptions nor overly fine-grained ones are adequate from 
either a cognitive or a semantic point o f view. A plausible event conception 
that allows the explanation of a wide range of semantic phenomena should 
take into consideration that the events we talk about in natural languages 
are events in the world as we conceptualize it. Having this in mind, events 
can be located more on the concrete side o f the spectrum o f different event 
conceptions. On this view, they are entities located in time and space, yet a 
temporal-spatial slot can in principle be occupied by more than one event 
under certain restrictions. More precisely, a particular time-space slot can 
host as many events as there are cognitive mechanisms to individuate events 
in this slot. The existence o f these event individuating mechanisms is an 
empirical matter o f cognitive science. Movement events shall serve in the 
following to illustrate this.
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4.1.2. The perception o f  events
If an individual moves by rolling, walking, swimming, etc. the time-space 
slot of this event is defined by the duration of the movement and the local 
position of the individual during the several stages of the movement. These 
movements involve two components, a change o f place from A to B, which 
I will call a translatory movement, and a particular fashion which character­
izes this translatory movement and which distinguishes the running from A 
to B from the walking from A to B. We might ask now whether we concep­
tualize Jamaal’s walking from A to B as a single translatory movement e' 
o f the walking-type or o f a translatory movement o f Jamaal’s body from A 
to B (e1) plus a simultaneous movement o f his body parts, namely those 
movements which characterize walking (e2) and which I will call relative 
movements. Since in the latter case e' and e2 would occupy the same tempo- 
ral-spatial slot, our conception o f events would force us to say that there are 
two different cognitive mechanisms, one that singles out translatory move­
ments and one that singles out relative movements o f different types.
Which options our cognitive apparatus makes use of can be discovered 
by exploring how we perceive the rolling o f a wheel. If  a wheel rolls along 
a street there are at least two ways in which we can conceive o f this move­
ment: (i) Each minimal part of the wheel describes a so called cycloid 
movement as depicted in Figure 1. The rolling along o f the wheel is the sum 
o f all the cycloid movements o f its parts. In order to see a wheel rolling 
along, we would then need a cognitive mechanism that computes cycloid 
transformations.
Figure 1. Description of a rolling wheel as consisting of cycloid movements.
(ii) Each part o f the wheel describes a translatory movement relative to its 
background and at the same time each part o f the wheel describes a rota­
tional movement relative to the center of the wheel as depicted in figure 2.
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The rolling along of the wheel is the sum of all translatory movements of 
its parts plus the sum of all rotational movements o f its parts. In order to 
see a wheel rolling along, we would then need two cognitive mechanisms, 
one that computes translatory transformations and one that computes rota­
tional transformations.
Figure 2. Description of a rolling wheel as consisting of translatory and rotational 
movements.
Psychological experiments carried out by Duncker (1929) and which have 
been given a formal treatment in Shaw, Flascher & Mace (1994) clearly 
show that human observers opt for the second mode of perception. We do 
indeed see two different movements o f the same object at the same time, a 
translatory movement o f the wheel (e') relative to its surrounding and a ro­
tation movement (e2) relative to the center o f the wheel. This complements 
other research on event perception, in particular Johansson’s work on the 
perception o f ‘biological’ movements, i. e. the movements o f living beings. 
Johansson’s experiments clearly establish that movements are always per­
ceived relative to particular reference frames which can themselves move. 
Particularly in the case of biological movements, we perceive a translatory 
movement o f the whole body relative to its surrounding and independently 
of that, relative to the moving body, the particular ‘walking’, ‘dancing’ or 
‘running’ movements (cf. Johansson 1975, 1978).
In sum, for movement events we perceive two events which fill the same 
time-space slot, a translatory movement event and a relative movement 
event, for each o f them there exists a particular, cognitively implemented 




This cognitive approach to movement events is corroborated by linguistic 
data. The level o f granularity we have assumed to characterize events can 
be shown to be linguistically relevant. In contrast to approaches which as­
sume movement verbs to be represented as consisting of an event-like com­
ponent plus a manner component (e. g. Talmy 1975; Snell-Homby 1983; 
Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1992), I adopt a two-event analysis o f move­
ment verbs’16 The event a verb like roll, swim, walk, or run refers to con­
sists o f two temporal subevents as in Lex 21.
schwimmen SYN: /nom
SEM: XxXe[SCHWiMM(x,e)]
LES: e l[+ D U R ]. XAGENT) 0  g2[+ D U R ]. XAGENT)
Lex 21. Lexical entry for German schwimmen ‘swim’.17
Three phenomena provide support for this approach. Firstly, if  the two com­
ponents o f movement verbs can be lexicalized separately, they are usually 
both lexicalized as verbs:
(20) a. The wheel went / moved down the hill, 
b. The wheel rotated (??down the hill).
If we think o f verbs as the main means to classify events, the existence of 
verbs like go  or move versus rotate indicates that we indeed distinguish the 
two components o f roll as different events and not just as an event and a 
manner, in which case we would expect the second component to be lexi­
calized as an adverb.
Secondly, in cases where a verb refers to a translatory movement only, 
and the specific relative movement is characterized by an additional lexical 
item, this item is usually a verb and not an adverb. In the Korean example 
in (21 a) the relative movement is expressed by a verb that becomes part of 
a verb complex, in the Spanish example in (21b), the relative movement is 
expressed by a gerund:
16 Kaufmann (1995: 232) and Paris (2003) make similar assumptions.
17 •The fully specified representation of schwimmen would of course include infor­
mation about the type of movements that the two subevents characterize.
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(21) a. John-i pang-ey ttwui-e tul-e o-ass-ta.
John-SUBJ room-LOC run-CONN enter-CONN come-PAST-DECL
‘John came in(to) the room running.’
(Choi & Bowerman 1991: 88)18 
b. El jefe entrö a su oficina corriendo. 
the boss entered to his office running
‘The boss ran into his office.’ (Paris 2003)
Thirdly, if adverbials are often clearly related to one o f the subevents, as we
have shown in section 3.1.2, and verbs o f movement denote an event con­
sisting o f two simultaneous subevents, then we should find that adverbials 
behave similarly in this domain. Indeed, adverbials like direkt ‘directly, 
straight’ and elegant ‘elegantly’ as in (22) are obviously related to different 
subevents, direkt modifying the translatory movement and elegant the rela­
tive movement (cf. Engelberg 2000a: 297).
(22) a. Sie schwamm elegant zum gegenüberliegenden Beckenrand.
she swam elegantly to the opposite pool edge
‘She performed a translatory movement accompanied by an elegant
relative (swimming) movement to the opposite pool edge.’
b. Sie schwamm direkt zum gegenüberliegenden Beckenrand,
she swam straight to the opposite pool edge
‘She performed a straight translatory movement accompanied by a 
relative (swimming) movement to the opposite pool edge.’
4.2. Events and “free will”
4.2.1. Volition and the licensing o f  the intransitive verb passive
Agentivity is one of the lexical-semantic notions that is notoriously difficult 
to define. It has been suggested that the agent is the one who “wills the ac­
tion and intentionally effects it” (Gruber 1976: 157), whose “action is voli­
tional”, who “is in control o f what he does” and “is primarily responsible for 
what happens” (Lakoff 1977: 244), who is “doing or causing something, 
possibly intentionally” (Andrews 1985: 68) and who is the “instigator of 
some action” (Radford 1988: 373). Definitions o f this sort o f course pre­
SUBJ =  subject marker, LOC =  locative marker, CONN =  connecting suffix , PAST 
=  past tense marker, DECL =  declarative ending.
18
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suppose that the terms used to define the concept o f agentivity -  ‘will’, ‘in­
tention’, ‘volition’, ‘control’, ‘responsibility’, ‘causation’, ‘instigation’ -  
are better understood than the term to be defined. However, I’m doubtful 
whether this is the case. In the following I want to have a critical look at the 
concept o f ‘volition’ and its usefulness for lexical semantics.
Among the phenomena which have been tied to volition and similar agen- 
tivity-related concepts is the intransitive verb passive, sometimes also called 
‘impersonal passive’, which is quite common in a number o f Germanic lan­
guages, e. g. German (23a), Dutch (23b), Swedish (23c), or Icelandic (23d). 
An intransitive verb passive can be defined as a passive construction where 
no subject (Mom) occurs which would correspond to a direct object (/acc) 
o f the respective active sentence.19
(23) a. Es wurde gerannt [ ...] .
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3SG run-PART 
‘There w as running going on [ . . . ] . ’
b. Er wird getelefoneerd. 
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3 SG telephone-PART 
‘There was phoning going on .’
c. Det skjuts ute. 
it shoot-PAS-PRES outside 
‘There is shooting going on outside.’
d. I>ad var synt. 
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3 SG Swim-PART-NEUTR-SG
‘There was swimming going on.’ (Yamaguchi 2002: 267)
The use o f the intransitive verb passive is restricted, though. Many intransi­
tive verbs do not allow this construction:
19 The conditions under which the expletive appears in Germanic languages are 
different (Siewierska 1984: 108ff). In German, the expletive may not occur if 
any other constituent occupies the “Vorfeld”, the position in front of the finite 
verb in main clauses (for a discussion cf. e. g. Fagan 1992: 177ff):
(i) Es wurde gestern viel getanzt.
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3SG yesterday a lot dance-PART 
‘There was a lot o f  dancing going on yesterday.’
(ii) Gestern wurde (*es) viel getanzt.
20 Most of the German examples in this section are taken from corpora available 
online such as the DWDS corpus (http://www.dwdscorpus.de/) and the COS- 
MAS corpora (http://www.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2/).
(COSMAS corpus)20 
(Zaenen 1993: 133) 
(Oksaar 1972:95)
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(24) a. *Es wurde erstickt.
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3 SG suffocate-PART 
‘There was suffocating going on .’
b. *Es wurde gestunken.
it AUX-PAS-PAST-3SG stink-PART 
‘There was stinking going on .’
The licensing condition has most often been formulated in terms within the 
domain o f agentivity. Wilmanns (1906: 302f.) claims that the intransitive 
verb passive presupposes “wirkende Personen“ (‘effectively acting indivi­
duals’), Curme (1970: 338) assumes that the intransitive verb passive can 
only be used with verbs “which express an activity or condition that stands 
in a relation to a free moral agent.” In particular, the notion of ‘volition’ has 
been brought into play (Perlmutter 1978: 16221, Moorcroft 1985: 160, Fa­
gan 1992: 124, Zaenen 1993: 147), i. e. it is assumed “that the one partici­
pant in the event described by the impersonal passive clause is volitional 
and that volitionality is a relevant factor in the formation o f the impersonal 
passive” (Arnett 1997: 399). Although the concept o f ‘will / volition’ has 
been extensively discussed in philosophy and the neuro-cognitive sciences, 
most linguistic work contents itself with an intuitive concept o f volition. 
Sometimes volition is equated with or vaguely paraphrased by other con­
cepts which tend to remain equally mysterious, though. For example, Arnett 
(1997) sometimes changes between ‘volition’ and ‘control’ as licensing 
property, while Zaenen (1993: 133, 147) starts out with controllability o f the 
event as the crucial factor, and then relates this property to that o f ‘volition­
ality’ as it is used as a proto-agent property in Dowty (1991). Dowty (1991), 
in turn, in discussing volitionality also brings the concept o f ‘intentionality’ 
into play. Zaenen (1993: 133) furthermore points out that the concept of 
control can be understood in the sense o f the predicate DO in Ross (1972) 
where every activity verb is syntactically embedded under DO (Ross 1972: 
70, 93). Ross himself, although he introduces DO as “a higher predicate o f 
intentionality” (Ross 1972: 105, 116), emphasizes that DO differs from 
Fillmore’s (1968) concept of agentivity since it is also used for the deriva­
tion o f sentences reporting non-volitional events like what the rolling boul­
ders did is crush my petunias to smithereens (Ross 1972: 106).
21 Perlmutter (1978: 162) states that besides predicates describing “willed and vo­
litional acts” also those describing “involuntary bodily processes” like sneezing, 
belching, sleeping are expressed by unergative verbs and therefore allow intran­
sitive verb passives.
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Thus we end up with a hodgepodge o f words referring to some unclear 
concept in the domain o f volition, control, intention, and agentivity. In the 
following I want to defend two claims: (i) ‘volition / will’ is not an ade­
quate concept to characterize the licensing conditions for the intransitive 
verb passive, (ii) Claim (i) or the opposite of it can only be upheld if  we 
have a sufficiently clear idea o f what ‘volition / will’ is.
The assumption that volition is crucial for licensing the intransitive verb 
passive in German can come in two variants. Variant A: the verb occurring 
in the intransitive verb passive lexically entails that the event denoted is 
brought about volitionally by one o f its participants. Variant B: in order for 
a verb to appear in the intransitive verb passive, it has at least to be infer­
able from the context that the event is brought about volitionally by one of 
the participants. Variant A is obviously wrong. Verbs like husten ‘cough’, 
rülpsen ‘belch’, schlafen ‘sleep’, atmen ‘breathe’, or gähnen ‘yawn’ (25) -  
even if I can cough, breathe or yawn volitionally -  do not entail volition on 
part o f the participant.
(25) a. In den Pressekonferenzen wird jetzt ständig gegähnt.
‘At press conferences there is now constant yawning going on.’
(DWDS corpus)
b. Da wird oft durch den Mund geatmet.
There AUX often through the mouth breathe-PART 
‘Breaths are often taken through the mouth there.’
(COSMAS corpus)
Zaenen (1993: 134, 147), who also observes this problem, wants to save 
‘volition’ as a lexically determined licensing property by claiming that the 
verb merely has to have a “volitional dimension”. While it seems at first 
sight that this weakening of the volition thesis affects only a handful of 
verbs which denote bodily reactions, a closer look reveals that volitionality 
is only very rarely lexically entailed at all. Even actions like drawing, scrib­
bling, tapping or walking are not necessarily carried out volitionally as we 
know from unconscious drawing or scribbling during phone calls, from un­
knowingly tapping on the table while thinking about the next sentence to 
write, or from somnambulists walking on the roof ridge. And even if we 
were very generous and would allow all verbs to occur in the intransitive 
verb passive which denote events which at least sometimes are carried out 
volitionally, we are confronted with counter examples like (26a). We can’t 
sweat by the mere force of our will. O f course, we can do something voli­
tionally that will make us sweat but we can also do something that will
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make us sink towards the bottom of Lake Erie without this something li­
censing sentences like (26b).
(26) a. Auf dem gleichen Sportplatz wird viel geschwitzt.
‘On the same sports field there is much sweating going on.’
(COSMAS corpus)
b. *Am Lake Erie wird wieder viel gesunken.
‘On Lake Erie there is again much sinking going on.’
Variant B of the licensing condition is often discussed with respect to ex­
amples like (27a) where it is claimed that verbs like bluten ‘bleed’ or sterben 
‘die’ can only occur in the intransitive verb passive because volitionality on 
part of the participant can be reconstructed from the context (here e. g. from 
the adverb willig ‘willingly’). But there are numerous examples where voli­
tion is neither entailed by the verb nor inferable from the context nor intro­
duced by the passive construction itself. Sentences like (27b) to (27e) are 
silent about volitionality if not even suggestive o f involuntary events. In par­
ticular examples like (27b) show that the small number of unaccusative verbs 
that occur in the intransitive verb passive do not depend on a contextually 
driven volitionality interpretation, as has been claimed by Fagan (1992: 124).
(27) a. Für den lieben König und Herren wird alles getan, wird treulich ge­
kämpft, wird willig geblutet, wird freudig in den Tod gegangen, für 
ihn wird mehr als gestorben ...
‘For the dear king and lords all is done, is loyally fought, is will­
ingly bled, is happily gone into death, for him is more than died.’ 
(Curme 1970; transl. by Arnett 1997: 408)
b. Jetzt wird in 559 Betten gestorben.
‘Now there is dying going on in 559 beds.’ (DWDS corpus)
c. Widerlich schmeckt plötzlich der Rauch. Rundherum wird ver­
zweifelt gehustet. ‘The smoke tastes repulsive suddenly. All around 
desperate coughing is going on.’ (COSMAS corpus)
d. Da aber niemand seinen zukünftigen Partner schon beim Kennen- 
lemen millimetergenau vermißt, hilft sich die Natur selbst: es wird 
unbewußt mit Auge und Gehirn gemessen.
‘However, since nobody measures his partner-to-be by the milli­
meter during the first meeting nature helps itself: there is uncon­
scious measuring by the eye and the brain.’ (COSMAS corpus)
e. Es wurde unbewusst/gedankenlos auf den Blöcken herumgekritzelt. 
‘There was unconscious/thoughtless scribbling on the notepads.’
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4.2.2. Neural event triggers
In the following I will try to narrow down the class of events that can be 
expressed in intransitive verb passive constructions and in the course o f the 
argumentation discuss the concept o f ‘volition’. I assume that a not too 
controversial concept o f ‘doing something volitionally’ in the sense of ‘ex­
ercising one’s free will’ reflects the following characteristics: (i) Free will 
is immediately directed towards actions, without any mediating causal 
links, (ii) Free will involves a choice, (iii) The actor o f a volitional action is 
conscious o f his will, (iv) Free will is not immediately determined by ex­
ternal events or stimuli.
If we look at events which are usually described by verbs with human 
referents in subject position we can distinguish five types according to their 
different neurocognitive status:
(i) Uncontrolled happenings like falling, stumbling or slipping (usually 
rendered by unaccusative verbs).
(ii) Uncontrolled reflexes like twitching (with eyelids), kicking (as the 
result o f a strike against the patellar tendon).
(iii) Bodily functions like sweating, digesting, shivering, hiccupping.
(iv) Controllable reactions like yawning, coughing, laughing.
(v) Impulse actions like running, scribbling, dancing, drawing.
Uncontrolled happenings are events that do not require any neurological 
activity on the side o f the individual involved in order to kick off the event. 
This is different for the other four kinds o f events (cf. e.g. Thompson 1985 
and Nolte 1999). “A reflex is an involuntary, stereotyped response to a sen­
sory input.” (Nolte 1999: 226) The kick which results from a strike against 
the patellar tendon is a simple and typical example. It just requires a direct 
connection in the spinal cord between a sensory neuron and a motor neuron 
(monosynaptic reflex). While not all reflexes are of the monosynaptic type, 
all reflexes have in common that they do not involve higher neurological 
components.
Bodily functions are processed by the autonomic nervous system which 
primarily consists o f the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems in the 
peripheral nervous system. Important nuclei o f the autonomic nervous sys­
tem are located in the brainstem. These areas are influenced by the hypo­
thalamus and parts of the limbic system, which is involved in regulating 
behaviour that is dependent on emotional and motivational states. Thus, in 
contrast to what has been said about mere reflexes, the central nervous sys­
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tem is involved in regulating bodily functions. However, cortical areas do 
not contribute to these processes, which therefore remain widely uncon­
scious and are experienced as not dependent on our “free will”.
Controllable reactions are events like coughing, crying, belching which 
are usually reactions to other bodily processes or perceptions and in so far 
similar to reflexes and bodily functions, but which can to a certain degree 
be suppressed or initiated by higher neurological impulses.
While reflexes and bodily functions are rather uncontroversial with re­
spect to what we assume to be our “free will” -  they are involuntary events -  
the final group, which I call ‘impulse actions’ poses some intricate problems 
if one wants to save the concept o f volition for semantic licensing purposes. 
Neurocognitive experiments starting with Libet (1985) have stimulated the 
longstanding philosophical discussion o f how the will relates to the action it 
brings about. When we carry out simple everyday actions, the neural activity 
starts in subcortical areas (cerebellum, basal ganglia) which are connected 
to the limbic system. From there the premotor cortex and the supplementary 
motor cortex are activated and finally, a couple o f hundred milliseconds be­
fore the action sets in, the primary motor cortex shows activity. This poses 
a challenge to our assumption that free will is a conscious trigger o f our 
actions, since the ultimate impulse for an action comes from a subcortical 
area which is not accessible to our consciousness. Libet (1985: 530ff) de­
signed an experiment in which the subjects were asked to register the mo­
ment in which they made a volitional decision to carry out a simple action 
like lifting a finger. At the same time their neural activity was being meas­
ured. The results showed that the will to carry out the action indeed pre­
cedes the activity in the primary motor cortex but follows the activity in the 
subcortical areas. The experiment suggests that free will is an accompany­
ing feature o f certain actions rather than their trigger. This of course does 
not correspond to our intuition about free will as the ultimate and non­
caused trigger o f our actions.
These experiments have set off a vivid discussion about the roll of voli­
tionality in human actions. We cannot delve into this here, but two remarks 
seem to be in order: Firstly, experiments o f this sort fit in with the observa­
tion above that a lot o f our simple daily actions do not necessarily involve 
the idea of acting volitionally. This pertains to actions like scratching, 
walking, etc. which do not involve conscious planning as does building a 
house or writing a dissertation. If  I do what I just did -  namely scratch my 
head -  then what was characteristic for this action was less that I did it by 
the force of my free will and more that nothing and nobody else forced me
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to scratch my head. Secondly, ‘volition/will’ is a much shakier concept than 
it seems at first sight. Thus, its unreflected use as a crucial semantic concept 
cannot really be recommended. I will therefore prefer to recur to ‘impulse 
actions’ as actions which involve neural impulses in subcortical areas as 
well as in the motor cortex (and which may sometimes be accompanied by 
an impression of acting volitionally).
One o f the reviewers suggested that a classification of events according 
to the way the neural system is involved in setting off these events cannot 
be the basis for a speaker’s classification o f verbal espressions describing 
these events, since speakers do not have access to knowledge of that sort. 
However, I think one is justifed in assuming that these neural activities are 
correlated with the way speakers intuitively categorize events they are in­
volved in, since they can judge in how far events originate within them and 
are not a mere reaction to something happening outside them, as detailled 
above. In addition, such a (gradual) classification is certainly presupposed 
for many aspects of human behavior in social contexts. Concepts like ‘guilt’, 
‘responsibility’, and ‘conduct’ are hardly conceivable without it.
4.2.3. Licensing the intransitive verb passive
Finally, what licenses the intransitive verb passive? Those verbs can occur 
in the intransitive verb passive which entail that the event denoted by them 
is due to activity in the central nervous system (within a human or other 
being exhibiting “higher consciousness”) and is carried out without having 
an immediate external cause, i. e. verbs that denote events of the types (iii) 
to (v) from the preceding section: bodily functions, controllable reactions, 
and impulse actions (e. g. Lex 22)." While there is a strong feeling that the 
ultimate triggers for these events are participant-internal, we don’t neces­
sarily conceive o f them as being carried out volitionally. Furthermore, it 
seems that the intransitive verb passive is more often found with verbs that 
denote actions in which higher neural areas are involved, i. e. bodily func­
22  nThis, o f course, should include more complex events which partly consist o f im­
pulse actions, e. g. building or playing:
(i) Es wird überall in Wuppertal gebaut.
‘There is a lot o f building going on everywhere in Wuppertal.’
(ii) So schlecht wurde im Westfalenstadion schon lange nicht mehr gespielt. 
‘There hasn’t been such bad playing going on in Westphalia Stadium for a 
long time.’
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tions like digesting and shivering are less commonly expressed in the in­
transitive verb passive than impulse actions like dancing or gossiping.
kritzeln SYN: /acc/nom
SEM: XyXxXe[KRlTZEL(x,y,e)]
LES: ( _ > l  g l[+ D U R ]. XIM PU LSE/... y  PATIENT) <  ^  ^ s - yPATIEN T)
Lex 22. Lexical entry for the transitive German kritzeln ‘scribble’.
This licensing condition excludes the other two types o f events, namely (i) 
uncontrolled happenings and (ii) uncontrolled reflexes. Indeed, in a scenario 
in which the eye lid reflexes o f people are tested (28a) is not acceptable. 
However, uncontrolled happenings as in (28b,c) do sometimes occur in the 
intransitive verb passive.
(28) a. Es wurde überall gezuckt.
‘There was flinching going on everywhere.’
b. In den Strafräumen wird zu oft gefallen.
‘In the penalty area there is too much falling going on.’
c. Es wird ringsum gestorben.
‘There is dying going on all around.’ (DWDS corpus)
What has not been noticed in the literature is that intransitive verb passives 
with these verbs occur in stylistically highly marked contexts. (28b) con­
veys that too many players pretend to have been fouled and clearly has an 
ironic meaning. What is meant is that they threw themselves down in order 
to obtain a penalty kick. As with other cases of irony, this can be explained 
by conversational implicatures and doesn’t affect the licensing condition 
for the intransitive verb passive. Finally, (28c) can only occur in a parti­
cular stylistic setting. The sentence functions as an emotional carrier of a 
message which deemphasizes any causes or circumstances o f the dying and 
completely focuses on the dying as such. That stylistic effects can be ob­
tained by violating otherwise valid rules in particular ways is common and 
does not disprove a rule that holds in stylistically more neutral contexts.
4.3. The duration of events
The distinction between reference to durative versus punctual events has 
proven crucial in several empirical domains o f lexical semantics. As we
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have seen in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 it is involved in the licensing condi­
tions for the ¿/«-construction and for the progressive. Furthermore, aspectual 
adverbials like fo r  five  minutes, in five  minutes, at that moment and aspec­
tual verbs like start, stop, continue interact in different ways with the dura- 
tive-punctual distinction (cf. Engelberg 1999b, 2004). It has also been argued 
that punctuality is a parameter in determining whether inchoative verbs in 
German occur with an expletive reflexive pronoun or not (Oya 1996) and 
that the formation o f nominalized infinitives in German relies on this para­
meter (cf. Blume 2004: 66ff).
The notions ‘durative’ and ‘punctual’ appear as predicates over events 
within Lexical Event Structures. The interpretation of these predicates seems 
to be straightforward within temporal logic: an event is durative iff its run 
time maps onto an interval and it is punctual iff it maps onto a temporal 
point.23 Yet, most verbs marked as punctual are not entirely lacking in dura­
tion. Events as referred to by break, jump, belch or knock take up some 
amount o f time, miniscule though it may be. In other words, these events 
do not occur at temporal points, a fact which has been observed before.24 In 
an early account, Pott (1859: 178) assumes that for aspectual verb pairs in 
Slavic and pairs in German like sitzen ‘to sit’ / sich setzen ‘to sit down’ one 
can discover “ [...] that in these pairs reference to the same kind o f temporal 
property is made, which involves -  to illustrate the matter briefly and aptly 
by borrowing a spatial metaphor -  whether they are thought of as being 
punctual in their duration (which, o f course, is impossible in the strongest 
mathematical sense and therefore only relatively true) or as being linear. ”25 
More recently Platzack (1979: 93) remarks that punctual events are those, 
“that do not last in time (or rather, are not conceived of as lasting in time)”, 
and Moens (1987: 102) claims that “[...] processes and culminated proc­
esses can be »compressed« into points. This [...] does not mean that they 
cease to have a temporal duration, but rather that their internal structure is 
no longer o f importance.”
23 The remainder o f this section is a slightly modified version of section 6.2 in 
Engelberg (2004).
24 For the history of the punctuality concept in verb semantics cf. Engelberg (1999b).
25 My translation of: “ [...] in beiden Rücksichtnahme auf eine gleiche Eigenschaft 
der Zeit, nämlich danach, ob sie -  um die Sache durch ein vom Raume entlehntes 
Bild in Kürze und schlagend zu veranschaulichen -  ihrer Dauer nach punktuell 
gedacht wird (was freilich in strengster mathematischer Strenge unmöglich und 
demnach nur beziehungsweise wahr), oder lin ear .”
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It is obvious that these remarks don’t explain what ‘punctual’ actually 
means. In particular, they leave us with two questions. Firstly, why should 
we conceive o f extremely short events as events without duration, or, in 
other words, why should we deceive ourselves about the true duration of 
events? Secondly, why do languages rely so heavily on a distinction be­
tween events that do not last for more than a couple o f seconds and those 
which last longer?
In the following, I will show that a cognitive basis for the distinction 
between short and long events can be identified. Research on cognitive 
time concepts reveals that a short interval o f 2 to 3 seconds plays a crucial 
role for perception, behavior, and speech production. The following phe­
nomena involve this three-second interval which I will refer to as the ‘cog­
nitive moment’ (Engelberg 1999a):
(i) Errors in the estimation o f  the length o f  intervals: Experiments show 
that the length of short acoustic or visual stimuli is overestimated while 
the length of long stimuli is underestimated; the threshold between 
over- and underestimation lies between 2 and 2.5 seconds (Poppel 
1978: 7231).
(ii) Oscillation o f  extremely fa in t sounds: Faint, barely audible acoustic 
stimuli like the ticking of a watch held some distance from the ear are 
only perceived periodically; the rhythmic appearance and disappear­
ance o f the sound perception occurs every couple o f seconds (Urban- 
tschitsch 1875).
(iii) Rhythm o f  metronome beats: Regular metronome beats o f equal acous­
tic quality are perceived as units o f two (or more); this “tick-tock” ef­
fect disappears if  the distance between two beats exceeds about 2.5 
seconds (Wundt 1911:6).
(iv) Oscillation o f  ambivalent patterns: The perception o f ambivalent pat­
terns like the Necker cube in fig. 3 oscillates between the two readings 
o f the pattern at least every three seconds or so; to a large degree this 
occurs independently of the will o f the observer (Poppel 1985: 56ff).
(v) Distance between pauses in speech production: Crosslinguistic inves­
tigations o f spoken lyrics show a tendency towards rhythms with short 
pauses about every 3 seconds (Turner & Poppel 1983). Comparable 
rhythms can be found in normal speech (Poppel 1985: 7 Iff). An inde­
pendent observation is that rhythmic pauses in speech cannot be ex­
plained by the demands o f breathing rhythms (Handel 1989: 426).
(vi) Rhythm o f  actions: Intercultural investigations show that simple actions 
like scratching, hand-shaking, knocking, chopping a tree, waving, or
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hammering tend to be bundled into rhythmic groups with a length of 
two to three seconds, interrupted by short breaks (Feldhutter, Schleidt 
& Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990).
Figure 3. Necker cube: the drawing is ambiguous as to which of the squares is per­
ceived as front side of the cube.
The cognitive moment or “subjective present”, as this interval has also been 
called, is determined by a neural mechanism that integrates successive 
events into a perceptual gestalt whose duration is restricted to an upper 
limit o f about three seconds (Poppel 1985: 53). This gestalt creates some­
thing like a “window of consciousness” that induces a “feeling o f now- 
ness”. Since the perception of events and the structure of our own actions is 
determined by the cognitive moment, it can be assumed that our general 
cognitive concept o f events involves a classification o f events that is mir­
rored in the way we use verbs to talk about events: punctual events are 
events that do not take longer than the duration o f the cognitive moment, 
while durative events exceed this three-second interval.26
Since this concept o f punctuality is by and large based on the perception 
o f events, its relevance for concrete, perceptible events is obvious. How­
ever, many verbs referring to perceptible events in their basic reading (29a) 
also have metaphorical readings (29b). With respect to the ««-construction 
(cf. section 3.1.1) both the literal and the metaphorical reading behave the 
same. Although the ««-construction was said to be sensitive to the punc- 
tual-durative distinction, the claim that the denoted event in (29b) is punc­
tual may be hard to defend in light o f the fact that it doesn’t preserve the
26 This concept of punctuality does not exclude temporal points in a logical sense 
from being employed in lexical semantics. I just claim that temporal points in a 
logical sense cannot be used in explaining the phenomena presented in this 
chapter.
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temporal structure o f the basic reading completely. Splitting a party can take 
more time than just a couple o f seconds.
(29) a. Sie spaltete das Brett / *an dem Brett.
‘She split the board / was splitting the board.’ 
b. Sie spaltete die Partei / *an der Partei.
‘She divided (“split”) the (political) party / was dividing the party.’
Thus, if we conceive o f the basic reading of a verb as being the reading in 
which the verb refers to a concrete event that is immediately perceptible, 
we can call those verbs punctual or durative which refer to punctual and 
durative events respectively in this basic reading.27 More precisely, we call 
those verbs punctual which refer to events whose only subevent (e. g., in­
transitive break) or whose caused subevent (e. g., transitive break) is punc­
tual in the basic reading of the verb. Thus, the ««-construction is not re­
stricted to verbs referring to non-punctual events only, but rather to non- 
punctual verbs in the sense just defined (cf. Engelberg 1999a).
5. Conclusion
The paper was mainly devoted to the following questions: How do we con­
ceptualize events and how is this reflected in language? The answers to 
these questions lead to an event-based theory o f verb meaning. I have ar­
gued for a conception o f a lexical-semantic theory which is not heavily re­
stricted with respect to the semantic structures it employs, but instead im­
poses strict demands on the clarity o f the metalinguistic concepts used in 
the representations. It has been shown how a better foundation o f crucial 
semantic concepts in empirical cognitive science might help to avoid se­
mantic “autoimmune” systems in which syntactic structures are predicted 
from lexical-semantic properties and the occurrence o f these syntactic 
structures is at same time used to show that the licensing semantic pro­
perties must be present.
27 This behavior of verbs with respect to the ««-construction is reminiscent of the 
behavior of verbs which have a physical and a psychic reading, e. g. German 
kratzen, (i) ‘scratch’, (ii) ‘worry, concern’. Klein & Kutscher (2002: 20ff) show 
that it is the physical reading which determines the valency pattern. They attrib­
ute this behavior to a principle of Lexical Economy which among other things 
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